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Abstract 
High social anxiety is associated with negative interpretations of social feedback, maladaptive attrib-
utions for success and failure, and excessive attention to internal and external threat cues. In the 
present study, 40 undergraduate participants with either high or low levels of social anxiety engaged 
in a series of social interactions with varying types of social feedback: negative, mixed-negative, 
mixed-positive, and positive. Given the increasing engagement in computer-mediated communica-
tion among individuals with high levels of social anxiety, these interactions took place via instant 
messaging software. Compared to participants with low social anxiety, participants with high social 
anxiety experienced more self-focused thoughts, negative thoughts, and state anxiety in response to 
increases in negative feedback. Participants with low social anxiety experienced fewer self-focused 
thoughts in response to increased negative feedback, resulting in a significant crossover interaction. 
Qualitative and quantitative differences regarding cognitive processes and computer-mediated com-
munication among individuals with high and low social anxiety are discussed. 
 
Keywords: social anxiety, fear of negative evaluation, social feedback, computer-mediated, commu-
nication, Internet use 
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Introduction 
 
Social anxiety is a common experience that can range from mild, transient distress to ex-
cessive and persistent fear that leads to significant impairment (Rapee 1995). For example, 
a national survey revealed that 21.2% of American adults experience excessive public 
speaking anxiety (Ruscio et al. 2008), and many more are affected at a nonclinical level 
(Kessler et al. 2005). 
Prominent models of social anxiety emphasize the importance of cognition. According 
to the cognitive model of Clark and Wells (1995), one distinctive characteristic of social 
anxiety is a set of dysfunctional beliefs and self-schemata regarding social interactions. For 
example, unconditional beliefs about the self (“I am inadequate”), perfectionistic standards 
for social performance (“I must be liked by everyone”), and beliefs about the consequences 
of social failure (“If I make a mistake, then I will be rejected”) contribute to the develop-
ment and maintenance of social anxiety (Clark and Wells 1995). Socially anxious individ-
uals may also form mental representations of themselves informed by physical sensations, 
thoughts, behaviors, and perceived external feedback, which are then compared to their 
excessively high standards (Heimberg et al. 2010). Heimberg et al. (2010) posit that social 
anxiety is maintained by the discrepancy between the mental representation of the self and 
the high personal standards for performance. Both of these models indicate a strong cog-
nitive component of social anxiety disorder involving negative beliefs about the self and 
distorted views of social events. 
Negative beliefs and self-evaluations are maintained by various types of biases in social 
information processing (Hirsch and Clark 2004). Specifically, socially anxious individuals 
have demonstrated excessive self-monitoring (Clark and Wells 1995) and excessive atten-
tion to threatening social stimuli (Heimberg et al. 2010; Asmundson and Stein 1994; Hope 
et al. 1990). Socially anxious individuals also tend to interpret social information in an 
overly negative way (Beard and Amir 2009; Hirsch and Clark 2004) and attribute positive 
social feedback to factors other than personal ability (Wallace and Alden 1995; Alden et al. 
2008). Additionally, emerging evidence suggests that socially anxious individuals experi-
ence fear in response to both negative and positive evaluation (Weeks et al. 2010). Thus, 
socially anxious individuals have demonstrated biases at multiple levels of cognition in-
cluding attention, interpretation, and thought content, which all contribute to the mainte-
nance of social anxiety. 
While most of the literature on cognitive bias in socially anxious individuals has used 
multiple-choice measures and rank ordering tasks, some have employed thought listing 
techniques to achieve a more direct assessment of cognitive content. Thought listing has 
been used to examine various aspects of cognition in socially anxious individuals includ-
ing rumination, focus of attention, and social expectancies (Vassilopoulos 2008; Chansky 
and Kendall 1997; Hofmann 2000). Most of these studies have examined the percentages 
or ratios of thoughts rated based on valence and focus of attention according to the tech-
nique of Cacioppo et al. (1997). However, studies of interpretation bias have tended to 
utilize more closed or force-choice formats (e.g., Stopa and Clark 2000). 
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The traditional methodology used in interpretation bias research relies on participants 
rank ordering a set of interpretations of hypothetical social events. This represents a meth-
odological weakness as rank ordering depends on the relative positioning of the options 
and not strictly the individual’s beliefs about the social event. Although Stopa and Clark 
(2000) incorporated open-ended responses to ambiguous social feedback, they did not 
measure interpretation bias related to the individuals’ own experience of social anxiety. 
Personal investment in the scenario is also important in investigating interpretation bias 
as socially anxious individuals have been shown to evaluate themselves differently in so-
cial events than they evaluate others or hypothetical characters (Stopa and Clark 1993). 
To date, no study has compared the cognitive content of high and low socially anxious 
individuals under varying levels of critical feedback to understand how interpretation bias 
may be reflected in cognitive content. Furthermore, nearly all of the existing research on 
interpretation bias has made use of between-groups designs in which one group receives 
negative or positive feedback and the other receives neutral feedback (e.g., Constans et al. 
1999; Stopa and Clark 2000). In a pilot study (Chappell and Ham 2012), it appeared that 
the cognitive and affective responses of high and low socially anxious participants were 
overly dependent on how explicit and robust the operationalization of the social feedback 
was. Non-socially anxious participants became anxious but still had positive thoughts in 
the negative feedback condition. The ambiguity of a neutral feedback condition elicited 
excessive anxiety among socially anxious participants. No known studies have used 
within-groups designs in which the participants experience a series of social interactions 
with varying types of feedback. A within-groups design varying social feedback across a 
number of social interactions may reveal shifts in thought patterns, such how positive feed-
back must be to evoke more positive cognitive and affective reactions in socially anxious 
individuals. Conversely, it may reveal whether individuals with low levels of social anxi-
ety ever exhibit the negative self-focused thoughts characteristic of high social anxiety 
when presented with negative feedback. A within-groups design is consistent with real-
world interactions in which different people vary in their reactions and social feedback. 
The pilot study also revealed the challenges of carefully titrating amounts of positive and 
negative exchanges in face-to-face interactions. A method of maintaining experimental 
control while keeping interactions realistic is needed. 
 
Computer-Mediated Communication 
 
Computer-mediated communication (CMC) refers to any interpersonal interaction that 
takes place through the use of computers, particularly via the internet (Lamerichs and Te 
Molder 2003). Trefflich et al. (2014) reported that 99% of American college students and 
79.5% of the general population are active internet users. The same survey indicated that 
90% of college student internet users go online every day to engage in computer-mediated 
communication. Some studies have found that socially anxious individuals are even more 
likely to use the internet for social interaction (e.g., Morahan-Martin and Schumacher 
2003). Caplan (2007) found that socially anxious individuals report a strong preference for 
CMC over face-to-face (FtF) social interaction, presumably due to the increased control 
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over self-presentation. However, in a survey by Erwin et al. (2004), socially anxious indi-
viduals reported that their existing beliefs that people are critical and rejecting are rein-
forced through internet use and CMC. Erwin et al. (2004) also found that CMC can provide 
social support that is difficult for socially anxious individuals to obtain elsewhere, though 
the sense of security offered by the internet may also enable individuals with social anxiety 
to avoid face-to-face social interaction. 
Of course, social interaction via the internet has some important differences compared 
to FtF interaction. Caplan (2007) points to a lack of nonverbal cues as an appealing charac-
teristic of CMC for socially anxious individuals. However, newer studies indicate that re-
cent developments in CMC have reintroduced those nonverbal cues through the use of 
emoticons, images, avatars, and video (Derks et al. 2008). Derks et al. (2008) found that 
emoticons can act as nonverbal communication in that they reflect and enhance semantic 
meaning in CMC. Importantly, this can lead to the same type of ambiguity experienced in 
FtF communication, in which nonverbal cues can be interpreted differently depending on 
the individual and on the incongruence of the nonverbal cue with the verbal message (Con-
stans et al. 1999). 
In one of few CMC-based studies addressing cognitive biases, Heeren et al. (2012) em-
ployed an online ball game task to nonverbally induce social exclusion. Some participants 
completed a dot-probe task to induce attentional bias to threatening stimuli prior to play-
ing the game while others did not. The participants in the attentional bias induction group 
experienced more social anxiety when they were excluded during the Cyberball game than 
the individuals who were not primed to attend to threatening stimuli (Heeren et al. 2012). 
The results of this study indicate that nonverbal cues in CMC can be powerful, and that 
cognitive biases demonstrated in FtF interactions may also be present in CMC. However, 
no known studies have used the Cyberball task or other CMC tasks to examine interpreta-
tion bias in socially anxious individuals. 
Due to the complex relationship between social anxiety and computer-mediated com-
munication, it is important that more research be conducted in this area. Fortunately, using 
CMC may also solve some of the previous methodological issues in studying interpreta-
tion bias in socially anxious individuals. Unlike studies using vignettes, a CMC task in-
creases external validity by placing individuals in social situations in which they are 
personally engaged. CMC methodology also provides increased control over the content 
of social interactions compared to studies with FtF social interaction tasks, thus reducing 
procedural nonequivalence for each participant. While this may also reduce the subtleties 
of nonverbal cues, there is evidence that these can be reintroduced using a variety of non-
verbal online cues (Derks et al. 2008). Compared to FtF tasks, CMC makes it easier to collect 
data throughout the social interaction. Detailed timing and content of response are easily 
available in CMC and participants can readily switch between windows to answer ques-
tions in real time about the interaction without disrupting the conversation. 
 
Hypotheses 
The primary purpose of the present study was to examine the effects of varying degrees of 
positive and negative feedback on state anxiety and cognition about social interactions in 
socially anxious individuals and non-socially anxious individuals. We hypothesized that 
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participants with high levels of social anxiety would experience more state anxiety, more 
negative thoughts, and more self-focused thoughts in response to more negative social 
feedback compared to participants with low levels of social anxiety. We predicted that 
participants with high social anxiety would report an increase in positive thoughts only in 
the most positive condition, while participants with low social anxiety would increase pos-
itive thoughts with each condition containing more positive feedback. Another purpose of 
the present study was to investigate the feasibility of computer-mediated communication 
as a methodological tool for studying social anxiety. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from an undergraduate psychology student pool at a large 
Midwestern university. Students in this pool completed a number of screening measures 
for several studies across eight different labs. They received invitations from up to 25 dif-
ferent studies throughout the semester and they had a choice of which ones they would 
like to accept. The present study was one of approximately 25 studies being conducted at 
the time using the mass screening student pool. Students scoring in the highest quartile 
(M = 37.45, SD = 3.97) and lowest quartile (M = 13.45, SD = 4.51) on the Brief Fear of Nega-
tive Evaluation scale (BFNE; Leary 1983) were invited to participate in the present study. 
These scores are within one standard deviation of BFNE scores from a previous study in-
volving a clinical sample (M = 46.1, SD = 9.5) (Weeks et al. 2005). Of 1252 students who 
completed mass screening across two semesters, 220 students consented to being contacted 
for future studies and also met the BFNE criteria. Invitations were sent to 160 potential 
participants (n = 84 lowest quartile, n = 76 highest quartile). In total, 42 individuals agreed 
to be in the study. Mass screening data from the two semesters were later combined to 
determine the final BFNE quartiles. As a result, two participants’ data were excluded be-
cause they no longer fell in the highest quartile. No participants opted to withdraw from 
the study. The remaining participants from the high social anxiety group (HSA; n = 20) and 
the low social anxiety group (LSA; n = 20) were included in data analyses. 
In the present sample, 60% of participants were women (n = 24) and the average age 
was 19.13 years (SD = 1.62). The majority of participants self-identified as European Amer-
ican/White (n = 36; 90%). A total of 2 participants (5%) identified as African American/ 
Black, 1 participant (2.5%) identified as Hispanic/Latino, and 1 participant (2.5%) identified 
as Native American/American Indian. All participants self-identified as heterosexual ex-
cept for one, who identified as bisexual (2.5%). 
 
Design 
The present study was a 2 (Fear of negative evaluation/ Social anxiety: high, low) × 4 (Feed-
back: negative, mixed-negative, mixed-positive, and positive) mixed factorial design with 
repeated measures on the second factor. Self-reported state anxiety and thought listing 
were the primary dependent variables. 
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Measures 
 
Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation 
The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation (BFNE; Leary 1983) consists of 12 items that measure 
the extent to which participants fear that others have unfavorable views of them (i.e., fear 
of negative evaluation), a core feature of social anxiety disorder. Respondents are asked to 
rate how characteristic of them each item is on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at all character-
istic of me) to 5 (Extremely characteristic of me). Total scores range from 12 to 60, with 
higher scores indicating higher levels of fear of negative evaluation. There is some evi-
dence that eliminating reverse-worded items provides a score with greater convergent va-
lidity with other measures of social anxiety (Weeks et al. 2005). However, the original 
BFNE was used in the present study to maximize comparability with other studies utiliz-
ing similar samples and methodology (e.g., Stopa and Clark 2000). Also, the BFNE is highly 
correlated with self-report measures of social anxiety (e.g., Weeks and Howell 2012) and is 
not linked to specific feared situations, an important consideration given the heterogeneity 
of fears in social anxiety (Collins et al. 2005). Thus, the BFNE was used as a measure of 
social anxiety. 
 
Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS) 
The Subjective Units of Distress Scale was used to assess the participants’ subjective anxi-
ety levels throughout the study. Participants were asked to report SUDS ratings on a 0 (No 
anxiety) to 100 (Highest anxiety level) scale before, during, and after each conversation. 
 
Thought Listing 
Thoughts were collected and rated based on the technique of Cacioppo et al. (1997). After 
each of four conversations, participants were asked to recall two thoughts they had during 
the conversation task. These thoughts were evaluated by two independent raters, both un-
aware of feedback condition and social anxiety group, for focus of attention and valence. 
Focus of attention was categorized as self-focused, other-focused (i.e., about the confeder-
ate), and situation-focused (i.e., about the topic or computer task itself). Valence was cate-
gorized as positive, negative, or unspecifiable. The observed Cohen’s Kappa for focus of 
attention was .83 (95% CI .78–.89), and Cohen’s Kappa for valence was .80 (95% CI .75–.86), 
indicating strong interrater reliability for both ratings. Discrepancies were reconciled by 
the principal investigator, who was also unaware of feedback condition. 
 
Manipulation Check 
After each conversation, participants answered five questions about their subjective expe-
rience during the conversation task. The key item asked participants to rate their conver-
sation partners (the confederates) on how judgmental they seemed on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale (1 = Not at all, 5 = Extremely).Other items were included to enhance the plausibility 
of the study as an experiment examining how individuals get to know each other via the 
internet (e.g., “I was able to get to know my conversation partner during our conversa-
tion.”). 
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Procedure 
The procedure for the study was approved by the university’s Institutional Review Board. 
Participants who met the BFNE screening criteria were contacted via e-mail and invited to 
participate in a study of social interactions on the internet. They were scheduled to meet 
in the research room with four confederates, whom the participants believed were other 
participants, and the experimenter. Care was taken by the experimenter to treat the partic-
ipants and confederates the same from the beginning to the end of the study. After provid-
ing informed consent, the participant and confederates verbally introduced themselves to 
one another. This was done to increase the credibility of the confederates as other partici-
pants in the study. Each person was then assigned to a computer in one of two adjacent 
rooms. The experimenter positioned himself or herself between the doors to be able to ad-
dress participants in both rooms simultaneously. 
Each computer was equipped with Skype, an online video chatting and instant messag-
ing software. The video chat feature was not used for the present study. After being as-
signed to a computer, the participant and confederates personalized their Skype profiles 
by taking a picture of themselves using a webcam and changing the profile name to their 
first name. The participant then completed self-report measures including demographic 
information and state anxiety (SUDS) on the computer. 
After participants completed the initial measures, the experimenter verbally explained 
the study procedure. The experimenter, participant, and confederates joined a group in-
stant messaging conversation on Skype where the experimenter provided instructions 
throughout the remainder of the study. The group was informed that they would have a 
conversation with each of the other four participants. For each conversation, the experi-
menter would announce a topic for everyone to discuss and then assign each participant 
to another participant as a conversation partner. These instructions took place in the group 
instant messaging conversation. 
When the conversation partners were assigned, the participant opened a separate con-
versation window with the assigned partner and then discussed the topic for 5 min. Con-
federates not assigned to speak to the participant pretended to type as if they were 
discussing the topic with another participant. After 2 min, the experimenter gave a verbal 
cue to complete a SUDS rating in the questionnaire window and then return to the conver-
sation. At the end of 5 min, the experimenter verbally cued the group to stop their conver-
sations and provide a SUDS rating and two thoughts they had during the conversation. 
They also answered questions containing the manipulation check. Then, the group re-
turned to the group instant messaging conversation to wait for the next assignment. Par-
ticipants first completed a practice round with the experimenter as a conversation partner 
to ensure that they understand the procedure. They then completed a total of four conver-
sations, one with each confederate who was assigned to provide one of four types of feed-
back (negative, mixed-negative, mixed-positive, or positive). The order of feedback 
conditions was counterbalanced and approximately two minutes were allowed between 
each conversation to avoid carryover effects. 
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Debriefing 
Before debriefing participants about the confederates, participants were asked if they no-
ticed anything unusual about the study or if they previously knew any of the other partic-
ipants. Two participants noted that they were confused by some of the overly negative 
comments of the confederates because they did not think a typical undergraduate student 
would react in that manner. However, no participants guessed that their conversation part-
ners were confederates. The experimenter explained to the participants that deception was 
necessary for the study to examine anxiety in a realistic social interaction. All participants 
verbally re-consented after the deception was revealed and all participants agreed not to 
share the study’s deception with other potential participants. 
 
Conversation Topics 
Six topics were chosen from a popular book of discussion questions (Stock 1987) prior to 
the study and four were randomly selected for each participant. All of the topics contained 
a moral dilemma which forced an either/or opinion and created a situation in which the 
confederate could be friendly and agreeable or negative and judgmental, depending on 
the condition. Topics included hypothetical questions about euthanasia, willingness to 
commit murder to end world hunger, leaving a note after scratching a car, informing a 
server about a missing item on a restaurant bill, cheating on a test, and releasing a medi-
cation with a one percent fatality rate. 
 
Confederates and Training 
One male and 11 female undergraduate research assistants were trained on all feedback 
conditions and included in the study procedure on a rotational basis. Each research assis-
tant completed multiple practice conversations which were rated by the principal investi-
gator with the conditions masked. A selection of practice conversations were also rated by 
individuals unaware of the study procedure and hypotheses. Research assistants were al-
lowed to act as confederates in the study after their practice conversations were deter-
mined to be consistent with one another and with written guidelines for each condition. 
Guidelines for the four feedback conditions included specific phrases and nonspecific 
verbal and nonverbal cues to be incorporated in conversation. Confederates in the negative 
feedback condition disagreed with the opinion of the participant and included scripted 
comments such as, “That doesn’t make sense. Explain it better.” and, “You really wouldn’t 
feel bad for hurting another person?” Nonverbal cues included increased response times, 
shorter responses, and not laughing at jokes made by the participant by typing “lol” or 
“haha,” and emoticons when appropriate (Derks et al. 2008). By contrast, the mixed-negative 
condition involved the confederate disagreeing with the participant with mixed, but 
mostly negative, cues. Specific comments included, “Your reasoning does not make sense 
to me. Can you explain it differently?” Nonverbal cues were similar to those in the negative 
condition but to a lesser degree. Confederates aimed for 75% negative cues in the mixed-
negative condition compared to 100% negative cues in the negative condition. 
The positive and mixed-positive condition followed a similar pattern. In both condi-
tions, confederates agreed with the opinions of the confederates. In the positive condition, 
the confederate was more enthusiastic and made comments such as, “That’s a really good 
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point! I didn’t even think about that!” Nonverbal cues included exclamation marks, emot-
icons, and increased participation in the conversation (quicker response time, helpful 
probes to maintain conversation flow). The positive and mixed-positive conditions aimed 
to be 100% and 75% positive, respectively. The order of feedback conditions was randomly 
assigned for each participant to control for order effects. All confederates gave feedback in 
all conditions. 
 
Results 
 
Preliminary Analyses 
A Chi square test indicated that there were significantly more women in the HSA group 
compared to the LSA group, χ2(1) = 6.67, p = .01, r = .41. Given the potential confound pre-
sented by this difference, a series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine differ-
ences between men and women on the primary dependent variables. The ANOVAs 
revealed no differences between men and women on SUDS, F(1, 39) = 1.04, p = .31, d = .32, 
the percentage of negative thoughts, F(1, 39) = 1.43, p = .24, d = .37, the percentage of positive 
thoughts, F(1, 39) = 1.47, p = .23, d = .38, or the percentage of self-focused thoughts, F(1, 39) 
= 1.73, p = .20, d = .41. These results suggested that significant differences in state anxiety 
and cognitions are unlikely to be due to gender. The HSA and LSA groups did not differ 
on age, F(1, 39) = 0.01, p = .92, d = 0.03, or ethnicity, χ2(2) = 2.11, p = .55, r = .23. Prior to the 
study, participants were asked a number of questions about their typical internet usage. 
Similar to recent studies (e.g., Jones et al. 2008), 95% of the present sample reported at least 
some internet use while 85% reported using the internet multiple times per day or more. 
Participants in the HSA group indicated more frequent use of the internet compared to the 
LSA group, F(1, 39) = 7.48, p = .01, d = 0.85. However, on days when participants used the 
internet there was no significant difference between the social anxiety groups in the num-
ber of hours spent online, F(1, 39) = 0.76, p = .39, d = 0.27. Differential familiarity with inter-
net use did not present a confound between groups. 
A series of analyses examined potential methodological confounds. The HSA and LSA 
groups did not differ on which of the six experimenters conducted the study procedure, 
χ2(5) = 4.04, p = .54, r = .30, or which of the 12 confederates provided feedback, χ2(8) = 6.99, 
p = .54, r = .39. 
The data were examined for violations of statistical assumptions of normality. The 
thought listing data were within normal limits, with skewness of 0.34 (SE = .37) and kur-
tosis of –0.001 (SE = .73) for valence rating, and skewness of 0.77 (SE = .38) and kurtosis of 
–0.06 (SE = .76) for focus ratings. The SUDS data were non-normally distributed, with 
skewness of 1.55 (SE = 0.37) and kurtosis of 1.56 (SE = 0.73). Logarithmic transformation 
was performed to improve the normality of these data. The transformation was successful 
in reducing skewness to 0.21 and kurtosis to 0.46, placing them within normal limits. Re-
sults of all following analyses were conducted using the transformed data, but the raw 
means are reported to convey differences in the original scales. 
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Manipulation Check 
The success of the experimental manipulation was assessed using participants’ ratings of 
how judgmental their conversation partners were. A 2 (Social anxiety: high, low) × 4 (Feed-
back: negative, mixed-negative, mixed-positive, positive) mixed factorial ANOVA re-
vealed a main effect of feedback, F(3, 45) = 20.33, p < .001, η2p = .58, but not for social anxiety, 
F(3, 45) = 2.33, p = .15, η2p = .13. The main effect of feedback indicated that each condition 
with more negative feedback resulted in more negative ratings compared to conditions 
with less negative feedback (using LSDmmd = .0.58). There was no significant interaction 
between social anxiety and feedback, F(3, 45) = 2.23, p = .10, η2p = .13. Table 1 shows the 
means for these ratings. 
 
Table 1. Thought ratings and conversation partner ratings by social anxiety group and feedback type 
Variable 
Social 
anxiety 
group 
Feedback type 
Positive 
M (SD) 
Mixed-positive 
M (SD) 
Mixed-negative 
M (SD) 
Negative 
M (SD) 
Partner ratings High 2.14 (0.69) 2.71 (1.11) 3.00 (0.58) 4.50 (0.53) 
 Low 1.70 (0.67) 2.50 (0.85) 3.50 (0.71) 3.60 (1.07) 
% Negative thoughts High 7.50 (18.32) 12.50 (22.21) 57.5 (37.26) 92.50 (24.47) 
 Low 2.50 (11.18) 7.50 (18.32) 32.50 (37.26) 45.00 (45.60) 
% Positive thoughts High 75.00 (34.41) 37.50 (41.68) 5.00 (15.39) 2.50 (11.18) 
 Low 75.00 (34.41) 60.00 (42.53) 17.50 (29.36) 5.00 (12.54) 
% Self-focused thoughts High 30.00 (37.70) 40.00 (38.39) 42.50 (37.26) 57.50 (40.64) 
 Low 50.00 (36.27) 47.50 (37.96) 35.00 (40.07) 17.50 (29.36) 
For partner ratings, higher scores signify negative impressions of the conversation partner 
SUDS Subjective Units of Discomfort Scale 
 
State Anxiety 
To examine the effect of the experimental manipulation on state anxiety, participants’ 
SUDS ratings after each conversation were submitted to a two-way mixed factorial ANOVA. 
A significant main effect of social anxiety indicated that participants in the HSA group 
experienced more state anxiety throughout the study compared to participants in the LSA 
group, F(1, 38) = 13.61, p = .001, η2p = .26. A main effect of feedback condition indicated that, 
as expected, the sample as a whole experienced more state anxiety in the conditions with 
more negative feedback than in the conditions with less negative feedback, F(3, 114) = 
18.71, p < .001, η2p = .33. SUDS declined significantly as each condition became more posi-
tive, except there was no difference between the mixed-positive and positive feedback con-
ditions (using LSDmmd = 0.11). 
A significant interaction, F(3, 114) = 3.293, p = .02, η2p = .08, revealed that participants in 
the HSA group reported significantly higher SUDS in every feedback condition except for 
the positive condition (using LSDmmd = 0.32). State anxiety increased as the amount of 
negative feedback increased for participants in the HSA group, but this pattern was not 
found for participants in the LSA group (using LSDmmd = 0.32). See Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. SUDS by social anxiety group and feedback condition. Note: SUDS Subjective 
Units of Discomfort Scale 
 
Thoughts 
Since participants provided multiple thoughts in each condition, these data were analyzed 
using the percentage of negative thoughts, percentage of positive thoughts, and percentage 
of self-focused thoughts within the full set of thoughts reported by each participant. Posi-
tive and negative ratings were mutually exclusive, but the valence and focus of attention 
ratings were not. 
 
Valence 
It was hypothesized that the HSA group would have more negative thoughts in each con-
dition with more negative feedback, while the LSA group would only report more negative 
thoughts in the most negative condition. To examine this hypothesis, a two-way mixed 
factorial ANOVA was conducted using the percentage of thoughts rated as negative as the 
dependent variable. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used when Mauchly’s Test of 
Sphericity was violated. 
There was a main effect of feedback condition indicating that thoughts were more neg-
ative when more negative feedback was provided, F(3, 114) = 52.55, p < .001, η2p = .58. This 
effect was observed between each feedback condition except for the comparison between 
the mixed-positive and positive conditions (using LSDmmd = 12.74). There was a main 
effect of social anxiety in that participants in the HSA group reported more negative 
thoughts overall, F(1, 38) = 13.17, p = .001, η2p = .28). Finally, there was a significant interac-
tion between feedback condition and social anxiety, F(3, 114) = 5.91, p = .002, η2p = .14. See 
Figure 2. Both groups experienced more negative thoughts in the negative feedback con-
ditions compared to the positive conditions, and tests of simple effects indicated that the 
difference across conditions was significantly greater for the HSA group. Further, the HSA 
group reported significantly more negative thoughts compared to the LSA group only in 
the two negative conditions. See Table 1.  
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It was hypothesized that participants in the HSA group would only report any positive 
thoughts in the most positive condition, while the LSA group would report increased pos-
itive thoughts with each increase in positive feedback. A two-way mixed factorial ANOVA 
was conducted using the percentage of participants’ thoughts rated as positive as the de-
pendent variable. The main effect of social anxiety was nonsignificant, F(1, 38) = 0.27, p = 
.61, η2p = .007. The main effect of feedback condition was significant in the expected direc-
tion, F(3, 114) = 66.47, p < .001, η2p = .64. Positive thoughts decreased as feedback became 
more negative except in the mixed-negative and negative comparison (using LSDmmd = 
12.90). Means for each group and condition can be found in Table 1. There was a significant 
interaction between social anxiety and feedback condition, F(3, 114) = 2.99, p = .04, η2p = .07. 
For both social anxiety groups, percentage of positive thoughts increased significantly with 
each increase in positive feedback except for the comparison between the negative and 
mixed-negative conditions (using LSDmmd = 18.24). For participants in the HSA group, 
there was also no significant difference between the positive and mixed-positive condi-
tions. See Figure 3. 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of negative thoughts by social anxiety group and feedback condition. 
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of positive thoughts by social anxiety group and feedback condition. 
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Focus 
It was hypothesized that participants in the HSA group would report more self-focused 
thoughts in more negative conditions while participants in the LSA group would not differ 
across feedback conditions. A two-way mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted using the 
percentage of participants’ thoughts that were rated as self-focused. The main effect of 
feedback condition was nonsignificant, F(3, 114) = 0.22, p = .89, η2p = .006. The main effect 
of social anxiety was also nonsignificant, F(1, 38) = 0.66, p = .42, η2p = .02. However, the 
nonsignificant main effects are likely explained by the crossover pattern in the significant 
interaction between feedback condition and social anxiety, F(3, 114) = 4.97, p = .003, η2p = 
.17. This interaction indicates that participants in the HSA group reported significantly 
more self-focused thoughts in response to negative feedback, while participants in the LSA 
group reported more self-focused thoughts in response to positive feedback. The interac-
tion effect is displayed in Figure 4 and means for each group and feedback condition can 
be found in Table 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of self-focused thoughts by social anxiety group and feedback con-
dition. 
 
Discussion 
 
Cognitive models have suggested that there are differences in the way socially anxious and 
non-socially anxious individuals attend to and interpret social information (Clark and 
Wells 1995; Heimberg et al. 2010). The present study provided support for these differences 
by examining cognitive and affective responses to social feedback among participants with 
high and low fear of negative evaluation. 
 
Response to Social Cues 
Heimberg et al. (2010) proposed that social anxiety is maintained by an interactive cycle in 
which excessive attention to external threat cues leads to increased self-monitoring. Results 
of the present study demonstrate this cycle of cognitive processing, which was present 
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only for socially anxious individuals. Participants with high social anxiety reacted to neg-
ative feedback with more negative, self-focused thoughts and greater state anxiety. Partic-
ipants with low social anxiety reported more negative thoughts in response to negative 
feedback, but the focus of attention shifted away from themselves and on to the confeder-
ate or the conversation task. The non-socially anxious participants’ increase in negative, 
other-focused thoughts was not associated with increased state anxiety. This represents a 
qualitative difference in the way the two groups attended to and processed negative social 
feedback. 
Other research has suggested that socially anxious and non-socially anxious individuals 
respond differently to positive social feedback (Wallace and Alden 1995; Alden et al. 2008) 
and may fear positive evaluation as well (Weeks et al. 2010). In the present study, there 
were two main differences between the social anxiety groups in their cognitive responses 
to positive feedback. First, socially anxious individuals overly attended to negative cues 
and discounted positive ones, demonstrating the social information processing bias noted 
in cognitive theories of social anxiety disorder (e.g., Hirsch and Clark 2004). Despite the 
substantial increase in positive feedback from the negative to mixed-negative feedback 
conditions, the means are very similar for the percentage of positive thoughts experienced 
by socially anxious participants. Positive thoughts did increase from the mixed-positive to 
the positive conditions for both groups, and the percentages of positive thoughts were 
similar for the two social anxiety groups in the most positive condition. However, in the 
mixed-positive condition—in which the majority of feedback was positive but some was 
negative—socially anxious participants had significantly fewer positive thoughts com-
pared to non-socially anxious participants. Thus, socially anxious individuals demon-
strated a bias toward negative social cues even when positive feedback is provided. 
Second, socially anxious participants demonstrated a dysfunctional bias when pro-
cessing positive social feedback (Clark and Wells 1995). While they reported more positive 
cognition in response to increased positive feedback, they reported fewer self-focused 
thoughts. This suggests that socially anxious participants may have attributed positive so-
cial feedback to external features of the conversation or the confederate rather than to their 
own social performance. The opposite was true for non-socially anxious participants’ focus 
of attention, whose thoughts became more self-focused as positive feedback increased. 
 
Methodological Contributions 
An important implication of this study is that computer-mediated communication is a vi-
able approach for research on social anxiety. The results of the present study were compa-
rable to similar studies conducted using face-to-face interactions (Constans et al. 1999; 
Stopa and Clark 1993), which suggests that similar cognitive and affective processes are 
taking place online and in person. There were also a number of advantages of using computer-
mediated communication rather than face-to-face tasks. Although beyond the scope of the 
present study, the online conversations can be saved for further examination of response 
times and relevant content variables. Online surveys can be used to collect self-report data 
during a CMC study easily and with minimal interruption. Further, increased control of 
stimuli presented to participants increases the internal validity. In the present study, this 
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also allowed for a relatively large number of different confederates and experimenters 
without introducing systematic differences between groups. 
 
Limitations 
There were a number of limitations to the present study. The sample size was relatively 
small, which may have limited the power to detect certain effects. Effect sizes were re-
ported and guided the interpretation of the results. In addition, there were significantly 
more women in the high social anxiety group than in the low social anxiety group, which 
is consistent with the over-representation of women diagnosed with social anxiety disor-
der (Kessler et al. 2005). Analyses indicated that gender was not associated with the differ-
ence in state anxiety or thought valence and focus. However, caution is warranted when 
generalizing the results to men with high social anxiety. Further, only one of the confeder-
ates in the study was male. The genders of the participants and confederates were not sys-
tematically matched, but analyses indicated no differences in same- or opposite-gender 
pairings across social anxiety groups. Fear of negative evaluation was utilized to define 
groups because the intent was to look at cognitive and affective responses to social feed-
back. A measure specifically of interaction anxiety may yield different findings and this 
should be examined in future research. Finally, the study utilized a non-clinical sample of 
undergraduate students, which may limit the generalizability of results in regard to both 
social anxiety and internet use. The inclusion of only the highest- and lowest-scoring re-
spondents may also limit the interpretation of the findings as it exaggerates the difference 
between the groups while in reality social anxiety is a continuous variable. Future studies 
may benefit from including a wider demographic range to examine patterns of internet 
use, and individuals with clinical levels of social anxiety to assure generalizability to that 
population. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The present study replicated and extended previous findings in support of cognitive the-
ories of social anxiety disorder (Clark and Wells 1995; Heimberg et al. 2010). Socially anx-
ious participants showed disproportionate attention to negative feedback, which was 
associated with negative self-cognition and elevated state anxiety. The present study also 
demonstrated that computer-mediated communication is a useful tool for studying social 
anxiety, offering greater control than is possible with face-to-face conversations. This is an 
important development as socially anxious individuals are increasingly engaged in online 
activities and computer-mediated communication. Finally, this study provides further ev-
idence that treatments that target self-focused attention and negative interpretations of so-
cial feedback are targeting a key feature of social anxiety. 
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